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LITIGATION FOLLOWING A CYBER ATTACK:
POSSIBLE OUTCOMES AND MITIGATION
STRATEGIES UTILIZING THE SAFETY ACT
Brian E. Finch† and Leslie H. Spiegel††
Abstract
Liability for a cyber attack is not limited to the attackers. An
attack may be foreseeable in some circumstances, and the failure of
the target or the other entities to take steps to prevent the attack can
constitute a breach of duty to injured victims. In the absence of the
protections provided by the Support Anti-Terrorism By Fostering
Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act, a cyber attack on a chemical
facility could give rise to a number of common-law tort and contract
claims against the target of the attack and other entities, potentially
including the target’s cyber security vendors. This article discusses
claims that might arise in various cyber attack scenarios and the
effect of the SAFETY Act on these potential claims.
The SAFETY Act is a tort liability management statute that was
passed as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Under the
SAFETY Act, entities that sell or otherwise deploy products that can
be used to deter, defend against, respond to, mitigate, or otherwise
combat “acts of terrorism” are eligible to receive liability
protections. These liability protections can take the form of
jurisdictional defenses, a cap on liability, or a presumption of
immediate dismissal of third-party liability claims.
This article reviews several scenarios to examine whether
liability could be found against companies that make cyber security
tools or against entities that purchase such tools. The article then
examines how the SAFETY Act could be utilized to mitigate or
eliminate such liability.

† Brian E. Finch is a partner at Dickstein Shapiro LLP and a Professorial Lecturer of
Law at The George Washington University Law School. He blogs for the Huffington Post on
cyber security and has a weekly cyber security column on the Fox business network website.
†† Leslie H. Spiegel is a Senior Risk and Compliance Attorney at Dickstein Shapiro.
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INTRODUCTION
Liability for a cyber attack is not limited to the attackers. An
attack may be foreseeable in some circumstances, and the failure of
the target or the other entities to take steps to prevent the attack can
constitute a breach of duty to injured victims. In the absence of the
protections provided by the Support Anti-Terrorism By Fostering
Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act, a cyber attack on a chemical
facility could give rise to a number of common-law tort and contract
claims1 against the target of the attack and other entities, potentially
including the target’s cyber security vendors. This article discusses
claims that might arise in various cyber attack scenarios and the effect
of the SAFETY Act on these potential claims.2
The SAFETY Act is a tort liability management statute that was
passed as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.3 Under the
SAFETY Act, entities that sell or otherwise deploy products that can
be used to deter, defend against, respond to, mitigate, or otherwise
combat “acts of terrorism” are eligible to receive liability protections.
These liability protections can take the form of jurisdictional
defenses, a cap on liability, or a presumption of immediate dismissal
of third-party liability claims.
As discussed above, this article will review several scenarios to
examine whether liability could be found against companies that
make cyber security tools or against entities that purchase such tools.
The article will then examine how the SAFETY Act could be utilized
to mitigate or eliminate such liability.
I.

LIABILITY SCENARIOS FOLLOWING A CYBER ATTACK
Cyber attacks are a well-recognized threat in today’s world.4

1. Other civil claims may also arise from a cyber attack. This article does not discuss
potential claims based on the theft of personal information, claims based on state or federal
environmental regulations, claims based on other statutory law, potential liability for criminal
negligence, or other criminal claims including claims against the attackers themselves. See, e.g.,
JENNIFER L. MACHLIN & TOMME R. YOUNG, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK - REAL
ESTATE AND BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS LAW § 8:21 (West ed., 2012) (discussing landowners’
potential environmental liability for contamination caused by third parties’ acts).
2. Of course, various common law or other defenses also may be available to these
claims, and these claims might be more or less viable depending on the circumstances.
3. See 6 U.S.C. § 441-44 (2002).
4. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT
OF
THE
U.S.
INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
(Jan.
29,
2014),
available
at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2014%20WWTA%20%20SFR_
SSCI_29_Jan.pdf (statement for the record of James R. Clapper, Director of National
Intelligence).
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Companies are regularly subjected to breach attempts by individuals,
organized crime, and even nation-states. These attacks have various
motives, ranging from the theft of financial information or intellectual
property to the disruption or destruction of operations, data, or
physical facilities.5 Below are several scenarios describing potential
cyber attacks and an examination about the potential liability resulting
from each.
A. Scenario One
A company that stores dangerous chemicals in large multithousand gallon tanks purchases cyber security software and hardware
(physical devices attached to IT systems as a cyber security measure)
to prevent outsiders from breaking into their industrial control
systems.
Through news reports and government-furnished
intelligence, the company is well aware that, while it is not being
specifically targeted by cyber-attackers, hackers have been breaking
into chemical companies and seeking to take control of industrial
control systems. The company has purchased “firewall” and “antivirus” systems to protect its facilities, including the systems that
control the storage tanks. Alternative cyber security systems could
have been purchased that would have protected against additional
types of threats. However, the company elected not to purchase such
cyber security technologies. A sophisticated cyber attack then occurs.
The attack was specifically designed to avoid the cyber defenses the
company purchased. As a result of the attack, dangerous chemicals
were released into the atmosphere, seriously injuring a number of
people in a two-mile radius and even killing several people. In
addition, because of the release of the chemicals, deliveries to the
company’s customers are delayed or cancelled, causing those
customers to slow or even halt production of their products.
1. Claims Against the Chemical Company
Under the laws of various jurisdictions, the company might be
liable for a variety of common law claims including negligence, strict
5. See, e.g., U.S. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., AND TRANSP., A “KILL CHAIN”
ANALYSIS OF THE 2013 TARGET DATA BREACH (Mar. 26, 2014), available at
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=24d3c229-4f2f-405d-b8dba3a67f183883; FireEye Advanced Threat Report – 2H 2012, FIREEYE 14-17,
http://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/fireeye-advanced-threat-report-2h2012.pdf
(last
accessed Mar. 30, 2014); Ellen Knickmeyer, After Cyberattacks, Saudi Steps Up Online
Security,
THE
WALL STREET
JOURNAL
(Aug.
26,
2014,
10:22
AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2013/08/26/after-cyberattacks-saudi-steps-up-online-security/.
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liability for abnormally dangerous activities, and contract claims.
a. Negligence Claims
A plaintiff injured by the release of chemicals may allege that
the storage company had an obligation to take further steps to prevent
the cyber attack. The success of this claim will depend on: the
foreseeability of the harm, the extent of the company’s duty to the
plaintiff, and the causal connection between the company’s failure to
act and the harm. A defendant’s negligence may give rise to liability,
even if a third party’s criminal activity also contributed to the
plaintiff’s harm, if the criminal activity was foreseeable.6
Several cases suggest that large-scale terrorist attacks may be
foreseeable in some circumstances. For example, in a 2004 decision,
a New York state court rejected an argument that the 1993 bombing
of the World Trade Center was unforeseeable as a matter of law.7
The court noted that the duty of property owners and landlords who
hold their land “open to the public” includes an obligation to “tak[e]
minimal security precautions against reasonably foreseeable criminal
acts by third parties.”8 A particular harm may be foreseeable if the
landlord knew or should have known of the risk of that harm.9
[A] landlord does not need to have had a past experience with the
exact criminal activity, in the same place, and of the same type,
before liability can be imposed for failing to take reasonable
precautions to discover, warn, or protect. The inquiry focuses on
10
what risks were reasonably to be perceived.

6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 448, 449 (1965); Ellen M. Bublick,
Upside Down? Terrorists, Proprietors, and Civil Responsibility for Crime Prevention in the
Post-9/11 Tort-Reform World, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1483, 1511 (2008) (“[P]roperty owners are
ordinarily expected to take reasonable care to protect against foreseeable crime.”); Vincent R.
Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 273
(2005) (suggesting that database administrators may be liable for injury from cyber attacks,
particularly when the administrators have a business relationship with the victims, because
identity theft is a foreseeable result of inadequately securing data); but cf. Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 318-19 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that “the
[1993] World Trade Center bombing was not a natural or probable consequence of any design
defect in defendants’ products”).
7. See generally In re World Trade Center Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2004) (denying summary judgment for the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey).
8. Id. at 734.
9. Id. at 734-36 (holding that a terrorist attack was not unforeseeable as a matter of law
when there was “evidence of the [building operator’s] actual notice of the risk of infiltration of
this kind of terrorist activity”).
10. Id. at 735, 739 (finding that the property owner’s own security analysis and other
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Similarly, a federal court declined to dismiss claims against
airlines and airplane manufacturers by plaintiffs injured in the
September 11 attacks.11 “In order to be considered foreseeable, the
precise manner in which the harm was inflicted need not be perfectly
predicted.”12 The airlines “reasonably could foresee that crashes
causing death and destruction on the grounds was a hazard that would
arise should hijackers take control of a plane” through inadequate
security screening, even if they could not foresee the specific
attacks.13 Likewise, an airplane manufacturer might have foreseen
“that a failure to design a secure cockpit could contribute to a
breaking and entering into, and a take-over of, a cockpit by hijackers
or other unauthorized individuals.”14
A similar standard of care may apply to cyber attacks that result
in personal injury or property damage.15 An injured claimant would
need to show that the chemical company violated its duty of
reasonable care by failing to protect against a foreseeable danger.16
The backside of the general rule that insulates the defendant from
liability in cases of unforeseeable intervening criminal acts is that
if a criminal or intentional intervening act is foreseeable, or is part
of the original risk negligently created by the defendant in the first
place, then the harm is not outside the scope of the defendant’s
liability—or as most courts still put it, the criminal or intentional
17
act is not a superseding cause.

Whether an attack was foreseeable will involve factual questions
information put it “on notice of a serious risk of infiltration of terrorist activity in the parking
garage” where the attack took place).
11. See generally In re September 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
12. Id. at 295.
13. Id. at 296.
14. Id. at 307, 312-13.
15. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of
Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1585 (2005) (“The owner of a website, like any
other retail establishment, could theoretically be liable for the reasonably foreseeable harm
caused by third parties that injure customers.”).
16. Cf. Levy-Zentner Co. v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 762, 781
(Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (reasoning that a landowner could be liable for injuries from a fire possibly
caused by third parties when “the [plaintiff] tenants and owners presented evidence strongly
indicating that the fire danger presented by itinerants was reasonably foreseeable”); cf. Tyson v.
Danbury Mall Ltd. P’ship., 811 N.Y.S.2d 105, 105-06 (N.Y. App. 2d 2006) (holding that a
property owner and manager were not liable for injuries to a plaintiff that occurred when the
plaintiff chased a suspected thief because the defendants “provided sufficient security and [] the
conduct of the individual who stole the plaintiff’s wallet, which gave rise to the plaintiff’s
injuries, was not foreseeable”).
17. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 209
(2d ed. 2013).
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related to, inter alia, the risk of the particular attack that occurred, the
company’s awareness of the risk, and the standard of care generally
applied to companies storing dangerous chemicals.18
The nature of the company’s duty to an injured plaintiff may also
be relevant. An entity that stores or handles dangerous chemicals
may have a heightened duty of care.19 Whether the nature of the
company’s work gives rise to that heightened duty of care and
whether or not it met that duty will depend on the circumstances. The
company could be liable for negligent storage or other negligence if
reasonable additional security protections would have prevented the
attack.20 Although in some circumstances the criminal act of a third
party acts as a superseding cause of harm, that rule may not apply
when “the [defendant] at the time of his negligent conduct realized or
should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be
created, and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity
to commit such a tort of crime.”21 In that case, site operators may be
held liable for harm caused to third parties by criminal intrusion on
18. See In re September 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 301 (“A finding of duty does not
require a defendant to have been aware of a specific hazard. It is enough to have foreseen the
risk of serious fires within the buildings and the goal of terrorists to attack the buildings.”);
James v. Jamie Towers Housing Co., Inc., 790 N.E.2d 1147, 1148-49 (2003) (“[B]y providing
locking doors, an intercom service and 24–hour security, [a property owner] discharged its
common-law duty to take minimal security precautions against reasonably foreseeable criminal
acts by third parties . . . .”); In re World Trade Center Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d 713 (2004)
(discussing foreseeability of particular terrorist attack); cf. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards, 6 C.F.R. § 27.410 (2012) (“Nothing in this part shall confer upon any person except
the Secretary a right of action, in law or equity, for any remedy including, but not limited to,
injunctions or damages to enforce any provision of this Part.”); AMERICAN CHEMISTRY
COUNSEL ET AL., SITE SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR THE U.S. CHEMICAL INDUSTRY (2001),
available at http://www.socma.com/assets/File/socma1/PDFfiles/securityworkshop/SecurityGui
deFinal10-22.pdf.
19. 59 N.Y. JUR. 2D Explosives and Fires § 37 (“Since the measure of care required is that
which is proportionate to the danger, a person who has in his or her possession an explosive
substance of a dangerous character is bound to the exercise of a high degree of care to keep and
guard it so as to prevent injury to others, and such duty cannot be delegated to an independent
contractor.”); see Garza v. United States 809 F.2d 1170, 1172 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting “the
elevated duty of care imposed by Texas law on those who use and handle explosives”); see also
Mayor and Council of City of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685, 687 (La.
Ct. App. 1984) (noting that companies that stored and transported dangerous chemicals “were
under a duty to carefully handle the combustible and/or flammable liquids in their control or
possession so that an unreasonable risk of harm would not be created for others”); see generally
Pond v. Regis, 270 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966) (noting that landowners may have a
duty to a child trespasser to maintain explosives safely).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965).
21. See id.; see also 14 N.Y. PRAC., NEW YORK LAW OF TORTS § 6:22 (“The chief factor
in determining whether the defendant [landowner] owes a duty to a plaintiff to prevent harm
from a third person is foreseeability of the risk of harm.”).
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their site.22
In this scenario, the company was “well aware of the
cyberthreat,” and depending on the circumstances, a finder of fact
might conclude that the cyber attack and the resulting chemical
release and injuries were foreseeable.23 The company’s failure to
procure effective cyber security systems might then be considered a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries.24
However, the mere fact that the company was aware of the risk
of a cyber attack may not be enough to render the cyber attack
foreseeable and the company liable.25 The failure to secure the site
22. See Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska
1978) (finding that “[t]he incendiary destruction of premises by thieves to cover evidence of
theft is not so uncommon an occurrence that it can be regarded as highly extraordinary [and] the
particular kind of result threatened by the defendant’s conduct, the storage of explosives, was an
explosion at the storage site,” and so the criminal activity was not a superseding cause of
injury); Randolph C. Visser et al., Volatile Combinations, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Nov. 2002, at
39 (“[C]hemical companies may also have a duty to protect their sites.”).
23. See In re September 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965) (“If the likelihood that a third person may act
in a particular manner is the hazard . . . which makes the actor negligent, such an act, whether
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being
liable for harm caused thereby.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM §
19 cmt. c (2013) (“If the third party’s misconduct is among the risks making the defendant’s
conduct negligent, then ordinarily plaintiff’s harm will be within the defendant’s scope of
liability.”); Visser, supra note 22, at 42 (“[C]ourts must now determine whether the events of
September 11, 2001, when combined with the 1995 Oklahoma City and 1993 World Trade
Center bombings and the political trend to protect the public from potential chemical terrorism,
have served to put all industries that deal in hazardous substances on notice to consider the
foreseeability of their products being used in a terrorist attack.”); cf. Levy-Zentner Co. v.
Southern Pac. Transportation Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 762, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that a
fire caused by trespassers on a landowner’s property may have been foreseeable).
24. See Doyle v. Exxon Corp., 592 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1979) (reasoning that, under
Vermont law, when a gas station owner was aware of a particular gas station’s vulnerability to
robbery and also of additional protections that could be put into place, “a jury could logically
conclude that the criminal events at [a gas] station on the night in question resulted, at least in
part, from [an owner’s] failure to install in a timely fashion a system designed to prevent the
very wrong that occurred, even though a contrary conclusion could rationally be based on the
same evidence”); see also Levy-Zentner Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d at 776 (stating that a landowner
could be held negligent for losses from a fire that began in its property when among other
factors it “neglected the rudiments of basic fire protection and inspection . . . and in violation of
its own regulations failed to take precautions against continuing itinerant activity that had also
caused [an earlier] fire”).
25. See Order and Opinion Granting United’s Motion for Summary Judgment That It Had
No Duty for Flight 11, In re September 11 Litig., No. 21 MC 101 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21,
2012) (finding that harm from terrorist attack was not reasonably foreseeable to an airline that
assisted in security screening when the terrorists used another airline’s planes in the attack and
noting New York courts’ “caution regarding the extension of liability to defendants for their
failure to control the conduct of others in light of the potential for unfairness and potentially
limitless liability”); District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 33 (D.C. 1987) (“[B]ecause of
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properly must have negligently “created or increased the risk of
harm,” or the company must have had another specific duty to the
injured parties.26
A claimant might argue that the company’s failure to procure
appropriate security systems “increased the risk of harm” in light of
the company’s knowledge that its site would be an attractive target for
terrorists and that it was vulnerable to a particular type of attack.27
Whether that argument would succeed would depend on the
circumstances, including the foreseeability of the particular attack that
occurred and the adequacy of the company’s protections.
b. Strict Liability Claims
The company could be held strictly liable if a court concludes
that the company’s storage of the chemicals constituted an
abnormally dangerous activity under the circumstances.28 Courts are
split on when the storage of chemicals constitutes the type of
abnormally dangerous activity that can give rise to strict liability.29
Whether the company could be held strictly liable for the discharge

the extraordinary nature of criminal conduct, the law requires that the foreseeability of the risk
of such conduct must be ‘more precisely shown’ than is usually required in a typical negligence
situation.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 cmt. a (1965); DOBBS ET AL., supra note
17 (“once courts decide that a defendant should use reasonable care to protect the plaintiff from
crimes, foreseeability of crime has become an issue of fact, not a rule of law. . . . [T]here is no
blanket duty [to protect against criminal activity] any more than there is a blanket immunity”).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 cmt. a (1965); see also In re September
11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 290-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (airlines and airport security companies
owed a duty of care to victims of the September 11 attacks who did not travel on the planes used
in the attack; “courts have imposed a duty when the defendant has control over the third party
tortfeasor’s actions, or the relationship between the defendant and plaintiff requires the
defendant to protect the plaintiff from the conduct of others”); cf. Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 313 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[M]anufacturers have no
duty to prevent a criminal misuse of their products which is entirely foreign to the purpose for
which the product was intended.”).
27. See District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 33 (D.C. 1987) (finding a school could
be held liable for the rape of a student when “school officials were on notice of the danger to
students from assaultive criminal conduct by intruders”); Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Svcs., 412
N.E.2d 472, 474-75 (Ill. 1980) (finding a landlord could be held liable for failing to provide
adequate security when a tenant was injured in a crime on the premises).
28. See Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska
1978) (“The considerations which impel cutting off liability where there is a superseding cause
in negligence cases also apply to cases of absolute liability”); DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK,
supra note 17 (“Courts now have generally accepted the principle that for some activities
involving special dangers, especially those not commonly pursued, liability can be imposed
without fault.”); Visser, supra note 22 (noting potential claims and defenses).
29. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 17 (noting that courts are split on
whether strict liability should be applied to “use or storage of explosives and similar activities”).
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under a tort theory would depend on whether the applicable laws of
the jurisdiction considered the company’s activities to be abnormally
dangerous in light of its surroundings, the risks involved, and steps
the company could take to mitigate those risks (if any).30 In addition,
many courts are reluctant to impose strict liability on companies
based on injury from a third party’s act.31
c. Contract Claims
Depending on the terms of the storage company’s agreements
with its customers, it might also be liable for breach of contract
claims for failing to make deliveries on time. The viability of
contract claims may depend in part on whether the agreements
provide that terrorism is an excuse for non-performance or whether
other excuses for non-performance apply.32
2. Claims Against Other Entities
Injured parties might assert products liability claims against the
manufacturers of the chemicals or the tanks, but those claims are
unlikely to be successful absent unusual circumstances.33 Courts have
rejected similar claims arising out of terrorist attacks, finding that, in
most circumstances, manufacturers do not have a duty to anticipate

30. DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 17 (discussing factors considered by
courts); see also Visser, supra note 22, at 41.
31. Compare Bianchini v. Humble Pipe Line Co., 480 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying
Louisiana law and declining to hold a pipeline company strictly liable for harm caused by an oil
leak when a ship hit the pipeline); Pecan Shoppe of Springfield, Missouri, Inc. v. Tri-State
Motor Transit Co., 573 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (finding a motor carrier transporting
dynamite not strictly liable for harm caused to plaintiffs when a third party shot its truck and
caused an explosion); with Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206,
1211 (Alaska 1978). See also Port Authority of New York and New Jersey v. Arcadian Corp.,
189 F.3d 305, 313 (3d Cir. 1999) (addressing strict liability products claims and concluding that
manufacturers of products that were not inherently dangerous did not have an obligation to
prevent buyers from “incorporating the [product] into another device that is or may be
dangerous”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 34 cmt. d (2005)
(noting a commentator’s “instinctive recoil . . . against holding the defendant strictly liable when
a third party, seeking to cause harm, deliberately . . . ignites the defendant’s nitroglycerin
factory”). The Third Restatement “employs a unitary standard” but “addresses the different
risks posed by different heads of strict liability” while “the case law in inconsistent in how much
emphasis it places on the foreseeability of the intervening act.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 34 cmt. d (2005).
32. See, e.g., 30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:31 (4th ed., 2004) (discussing force
majeure clauses).
33. See Port Authority, 189 F.3d 305; see also Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc.,
160 F. 3d 613 (10th Cir. 1998).
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the criminal misuse of their products.34
a. Design Defect Claims
An injured plaintiff might assert that the manufacturer of the
chemicals should have taken steps to decrease the risk of harm from
the chemicals.35 The fact that the chemicals could be misused by
criminals is unlikely to give rise to a successful products claim
against the manufacturer; the plaintiff would need to establish that the
chemicals were unsafe as used by an “ordinary consumer.”36
The plaintiff might also allege that the tank manufacturer should
have designed its tanks in a more secure way.37 Such claims could
sound in strict liability, and their success would depend on the facts.38
As a comparison, one court declined to find a builder liable for harm
from the September 11 terrorist attacks when “‘[t]he risk reasonably
to be perceived’ by [defendants], and their ‘duty to be obeyed,’ [in
designing the building] did not encompass the strange, improbable,
and attenuated chain of events that led to 7 World Trade Center’s
collapse” and other losses.39
b. Failure-to-Warn Claims
A plaintiff might also assert failure-to-warn claims against the
chemical manufacturer or the tank manufacturer.40 Those claims
might assert that the chemical manufacturer should have warned of
the harm from the chemicals and the importance of securing them
from unauthorized access and/or that the tank manufacturer should
have warned that the tanks could be vulnerable to cyber attacks unless

34. See Port Authority, 189 F.3d at 313; see also Gaines-Tabb, 160 F.3d 613; Visser,
supra note 22 (discussing case law).
35. See Port Authority, 189 F.3d at 310-11 (describing allegations that the manufacturers
of chemicals used in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center should have reformulated the
chemicals to “decrease or eliminate their explosive properties”); see also Gaines-Tabb, 160 F.3d
at 624-25 (rejecting similar allegations by plaintiffs injured in the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing).
36. See Gaines-Tabb, 160 F.3d at 624-25.
37. See Port Authority, 189 F.3d at 310-11.
38. Id. at 312 (“[U]nder New York law, theories of negligence and strict liability for
design and warning defects are functionally equivalent.”).
39. See Aegis Ins. Services, Inc. v. 7 World Trade Co., 865 F. Supp. 2d 370, 384
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
40. See Port Authority, 189 F.3d at 310-11 (describing allegations that defendant
manufacturers failed to advise their distributors and customers “to confirm that buyers in the
general and unrestricted public market have legitimate and lawful purposes for use of
Defendant’s products”).
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additional protections were installed.
In this scenario, however, the company storing the chemicals
was aware of those particular risks. A manufacturer’s failure to warn
gives rise to liability only if “such a warning would have prevented
the harm.”41 A court might be disinclined to find that the
manufacturers were required to provide additional warnings about a
potential attack.42 Companies are unlikely to have an obligation to
“warn the suppliers of its product of possible criminal misuse.”43
B. Scenario Two
Assume for Scenario Two the same facts as Scenario One,
except that the chemical company buys an industrial control system
(ICS) without evaluating the security risks associated with it. The
company never inquires as to whether the ICS has been successfully
subjected to a cyber attack before or whether the manufacturer has
embedded any cyber security mechanisms in the ICS, and does not try
to determine whether the ICS will integrate with existing cyber
security systems or possible future purchases.44 Alternative ICS
products exist, including ones built with “whitelisting” (meaning that
they will only respond to specific commands, which is a cyber
security measure that could have mitigated or defeated the cyber
attack).
1. Claims Against the Chemical Company
As in Scenario One, whether the chemical company had a duty
to the victims of the attackers and whether the company violated this
duty is likely to be a question of fact. An injured plaintiff might
argue that, in light of the company’s knowledge of the risks, it was
negligent for the company not to investigate the security of the ICS.
As in Scenario One, whether that claim will succeed will depend on
the foreseeability of the particular attack and other factors.45

41. Id. at 320.
42. Id. at 310-11.
43. Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 625 (10th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting failure-to-warn claims against manufacturers of chemicals used in the Oklahoma City
bombing).
44. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-82
REVISION 1, GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS) SECURITY (2013), available at
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r1.pdf.
45. See, e.g., Doyle v. Exxon Corp., 592 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1979); see supra Part
I.A.1.a.

FINCH & SPIEGEL

2014]

4/27/2014 7:38 PM

LITIGATION FOLLOWING A CYBER ATTACK

361

2. Claims Against Other Entities
Depending on the nature of the industrial control system used
and the nature of the representations the seller made about the system,
a plaintiff also might assert that the sellers failed to adequately
disclose the limitations of the systems or that defects in the system
caused the plaintiff’s losses. The plaintiff would need to show that
the ICS seller had a duty to the injured plaintiff and that it breached
that duty. It is not clear that such a duty would exist.46
For the vendor to be liable for an injury, the harm must have
been one that the security system was intended to prevent.47 The
liability of the ICS seller may depend on the purpose of the product,
and, in particular, whether it was intended to protect against
operational problems or intentional attacks.48
Whether the company storing the chemicals could assert claims
for contribution, indemnity, or breach of contract against the ICS
vendor might depend on the terms of the parties’ agreement.49 The
company might also assert negligence or products-liability claims
against the manufacturer of the control system.50
C. Scenario Three
Assume for Scenario Three the same facts as Scenario One,
except in this case the cyber security vendor selling products and
services to the chemical company makes specific representations
regarding the capabilities of its products and services, including that it
regularly updates its products and that it is one of the most
comprehensive anti-virus products on the market. The company does

46. See infra Part I.A; see also Port Authority, 189 F.3d at 320 (finding no New York law
“which supports the existence of a duty to warn middlemen that consumers, after purchasing
their product, may alter the products and harm third parties”).
47. See Lenox, Inc. v. Triangle Auto Alarm, 738 F. Supp. 262, 267 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(holding that an auto alarm company had a duty to “to install auto alarms in a manner that
activates whatever deterrent capacity the alarm may have” but not to “to prevent the theft of
plaintiff’s jewelry samples” since it was not foreseeable that a plaintiff would store over
$100,000 worth of jewelry samples in his car); Collins & Sons Fine Jewelry, Inc. v. Carolina
Safety Systems, Inc., 371 S.E.2d 539, 544-45 (S.C. 1988) (“[A] theft by burglary is a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of a malfunctioning alarm system.”).
48. See id.
49. See 2 RANDY V. SABETT, 2 INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE § 27:19 (Westlaw 2013).
50. See supra Section I.A.2; infra Section I.C.2. But see Rustad & Koenig, supra note
15, at 1579 (“Although product liability concepts have been extended to durable goods that
incorporate software, they have never been applied [to] defective software alone because such
causes of action were initially conceived as remedies for personal injury, rather than for
financial loss.”).

FINCH & SPIEGEL

362

4/27/2014 7:38 PM

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 30

not note, however, that the product does not protect against
specifically targeted attacks. Instead, it only says “we regularly
update our programs so that you will have best in class protections
available.” After the attack occurs an audit discovers that the cyber
security program would never have stopped the kind of attack that
happened. On top of that it is discovered that the cyber security’s
quality control process was imperfect, such that updates were not sent
regularly or timely, and that there was a defect in the software that
hackers with moderate to advanced skills could use to deactivate the
protections in order to facilitate an attack.
1. Claims Against the Chemical Company
The company would be likely to argue in this scenario that its
investigation of the cyber security product and its efforts to mitigate
the risk of a cyber attack constituted reasonable care and that it
therefore cannot be held liable for negligence. Whether that argument
would succeed could depend on the factual question of whether a
reasonable entity in the company’s position would have undertaken
further investigations.
2. Claims Against the Cyber Security Vendor
a. Claims by the Chemical Company
Depending on the terms of the cyber security vendor’s
agreement with the company, it might be liable to the company for
damages arising from the vendor’s breach of its agreement.51 The
company might assert contract claims based on the stated scope of
services, standard of care, or any warranties or other representations
about the product’s capabilities, and it might allege that any stated
limitations on the vendor’s liability did not apply.52 Whether those
claims would succeed would depend on the agreement’s language and
the particular attack. The vendor might also be liable to the company
for negligence if the vendor breached its duty to the company and the
parties’ agreement did not limit that liability.53

51. See Mary G. Leary, 72 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts - Liability for Security or Burglar
Alarm System Failure § 5 (2013).
52. Cf. id.
53. See Abdallah v. Caribbean Sec. Agency, 557 F.2d 61, 63 (3rd Cir. 1977) (“In those
cases dealing with the liability of a burglar alarm company whose system fails to function, it has
been held that the company is not liable for the loss on the theory that the burglary was an
unforeseeable intervening criminal act breaking the chain of causation. However, while an
intervening criminal act usually breaks the chain of causation and thereby negates liability based
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The vendor may also be liable to its customer for negligent or
intentional misrepresentation, depending on the circumstances.54
These claims will depend on the whether the inaccuracies in the
vendor’s statements were “material” to the company’s decision to buy
the product and the knowledge available to the vendor when it made
its statements.55 In some circumstances, the vendor could be strictly
liable for offering a defective product.56
b. Claims by Other Parties
As in Scenario Two, the vendor would probably not be liable to
non-customers injured in the attack unless a court found that the
vendor had a duty to those claimants and its breach of that duty
proximately caused their injuries.57
A court will probably be reluctant to find that a security system
vendor has a duty to claimants other than their own customers, absent
unusual circumstances.58 The seller of a security system is unlikely to
on negligence, where an intervening act is foreseeable, the original actor’s negligence may be
considered the proximate cause of the loss and he may be liable notwithstanding the intervening
criminal act.”); 72 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts - Liability for Security or Burglar Alarm System
Failure § 2 (2013) (“A finding that intervening criminal conduct was foreseeable as a result of
the defendant’s negligence appears to be particularly likely, or at least may require the
submission of the causation issue to the jury, where the original conduct involved was intended
to prevent the very harm that occurred, such as where the negligent conduct involved the
installation, servicing, or monitoring of a security or burglar alarm system, and a burglary occurs
thereafter.”).
54. See 72 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts - Liability for Security or Burglar Alarm System
Failure § 4 (2013) (citing case law).
55. See id. at §§ 4, 4.5.
56. See id. at § 6 (“[U]nder the appropriate circumstances, the negligent manufacturing of
a burglar alarm system can be the proximate cause of damages where it is reasonably
foreseeable that a defectively manufactured burglar alarm system would increase the likelihood
of successful burglaries.”).
57. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 15, at 1603 (“If terrorists had exploited a security
hole in software to conduct illicit communications channels to coordinate [the September 11
attacks], the security hole theoretically could be deemed a cause-in-fact of the billions of dollars
of damages that occurred . . . . A court would be unlikely to determine the insecure software a
proximate cause of the thousands of deaths and destruction even if the security hole was a
cause-in-fact of the attacks.”).
58. See Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services, 412 N.E.2d 472, 475 (Ill. 1980) (finding
that a security service was not liable to a tenant who was injured in a crime); see also Gaston
Furs Ltd. v. Comet Realty Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding a
security guard service was not liable for building tenant’s losses in a theft when the service’s
“contract with the [building] owner limited its services to the lobby of the building” and “[t]here
was no evidence that it assumed a special duty of care to [the tenant]”); New Focus Sportswear,
Inc. v. P.J. Fabrico, Inc., 561 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (finding that a sprinkler
company hired by a building manager did not owe a duty to the customer of a building tenant);
SHEPARD’S EDITORIAL STAFF, 6 CAUSES OF ACTION 659, §§ 6.5, 9 (1985) (citing cases).
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have a duty to a non-customer when the seller did not accept that
obligation and the non-customer did not take action in reliance on the
system.59 In some cases, though, an injured party may be a
foreseeable beneficiary of the security vendor’s agreement with its
customer.60 If so, the vendor could be liable to injured third parties
for breaches of its obligations under the contract.61
A duty to third parties may arise if the parties specify that the
third parties are intended to be beneficiaries of the agreement or if the
vendor’s affirmative error “creates or increases an unreasonable risk
of harm” or “renders the third-party beneficiary less safe on balance
than if no action had been taken at all.”62 An injured party might
argue that the defects in the security system created an “unreasonable
risk of harm” by failing to protect the company’s systems adequately
or by negligently misleading the company about the extent of its
security protections.63
A court might find that vendors of cyber security systems have a
duty to at least some non-customers if the parties’ agreement
specified that a purpose of the controls was to protect third parties or
if the vendor’s failures unreasonably increased the harm to the noncustomers. It is not clear whether that duty would extend to all
59. See Gerace v. Holmes Protection of Phila., 516 A.2d 354, 358 (Pa. 1986) (finding that
the owner of a ring stolen in a burglary at a jewelry store could not state a claim against the
store’s security vendor as a third-party beneficiary of the agreement between the store and the
vendor), app. den. 527 A.2d 541 (Pa. 1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT.
HARM § 43 (2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
60. See Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 493 N.E.2d 1022, 1028 (Ill.
1986) (a fire alarm company had a duty of care to tenants whose premises adjoined its
customer’s space in a warehouse); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM §
43 (2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965) (“One who undertakes . . . to
render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise
reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed
by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the
third person upon the undertaking.”).
61. See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. APF Fire Protection, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7935, 2012 WL
3834743, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2012) (finding that a tenant of a building may be
considered a third-party beneficiary of a building owner’s agreement with a sprinkler
maintenance company).
62. See id.
63. Cf. ADT Security Services, Inc. v. Swenson, 276 F.R.D. 278, 305 (D. Minn. 2011)
(denying summary judgment to a security services company on negligence claims when the
estate and children of a murdered customer offered evidence that the customer “was lured into a
false sense of security by presuming that [the security company] had installed a security system
that would provide audible notice when [the murderer] cut the telephone wires and broke into
the home”).
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potential plaintiffs injured by the cyber attack.64 Even if the cyber
security vendor owes a duty of care to parties other than its
customers, that duty may be circumscribed by the vendor’s agreement
with its customers.65 As a practical matter, that means that third-party
claimants may be bound by any contractual limits on negligence
liability.66 Public policy may prevent the vendor from limiting its
liability for gross negligence or intentional misconduct.67
D. Scenario Four
Company X operates a facility involved in the handling and
disposal of extremely hazardous and dangerous materials, such as
explosives or highly volatile chemicals. The materials it stores must
be kept in a precisely controlled environment, as a change in
temperature, humidity, or excessive vibrations could result in
catastrophic detonations. Company X has recently automated such
controls as a way to exclude the human error element. A cyber
security vendor sells Company X hardware and software to prevent
the disruption or altering of the key storage controls. Hackers,
however, are able to defeat the cyber security controls, causing
material changes in storage conditions that lead to explosions with
resulting death, injuries, and business interruption for nearby
commercial facilities due to the toxic releases and presence of

64. See SABETT, supra note 49 (“In order for an information security negligence action to
prevail, there must initially be a duty between the organization whose system is breached and
the third party with which the company has no preexisting contractual arrangement for the
company to protect its computer network from threats to its own system . . . . Existing case law
is not clear on whether there is such a duty . . . in the case of information security breaches.”).
However, it may be difficult for third parties to establish the vendor’s duty to third parties.
65. See ADT Security Services, Inc., 276 F.R.D. at 303 (noting split between courts on the
issue and holding that the children of a security system’s customer were bound by the
limitations on liability in the customer’s agreement); John T. Coyne, Effect of Exculpatory
Contractual Provisions on Tort Liability to Third Parties, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 785, 785 (1996)
(“Courts are divided over whether third-party tort claims are subject to exculpatory contractual
provisions that limit the promisor’s liability to the promise.”); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation,
Validity, Construction, and Application of Exculpatory and Limitation of Liability Clauses in
Burglary, Fire, and Other Home and Business Monitoring Service Contracts, 36 A.L.R. 6th
305, §§ 21-22 (2008) (citing cases deciding the issue both ways); but see Scott & Fetzer Co. v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 493 N.E.2d 1022, 1027-28 (Ill. 1986) (declining to apply contractual
limits on liability to claims by third parties).
66. See ADT Security Services, Inc., 276 F.R.D. at 303; cf. Aphrodite Jewelry, Inc. v.
D&W Central Station Alarm Co., Inc., 681 N.Y.S.2d 305, (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (enforcing
exculpatory clauses of contract in a suit by the purchaser of a security system).
67. See ADT Security Services, Inc., 276 F.R.D. at 301 (D. Minn. 2011); Cirillo v.
Slomin’s, Inc., 768 N.Y.S.2d 759, 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (declining to dismiss a
consumer’s fraud claims against a security system vendor); Shields, supra note 65, §14.
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unexploded but live material all around the facility.
1. Claims Against the Chemical Company
As discussed above, a company may have a heightened duty of
care when it engages in abnormally dangerous activities.68 That duty
may give rise to strict liability to third parties harmed by the
activities.69
2. Claims Against Other Entities
The cyber security vendor may be considered to have breached a
duty of care to purchasers of its product if a design defect in the
control system permitted the cyber attack.70 Company X may be able
to seek common-law indemnification from the cyber security vendor
if the company was not itself negligent.71 Contractual indemnity may
also be available, depending on the terms of the parties’ agreement.
E. Scenario Five
Assume for Scenario Five the same facts as Scenario Four,
except that the cyber security vendor markets its products and
services specifically to the companies in the business of handling
extremely dangerous materials, like Company X. It markets its
products as so robust and well-built that a business like Company X
can rest easy knowing that it has bought cyber security products and
services designed specifically to protect the incredibly precise
requirements of Company X.
1. Claims Against the Chemical Company
In this scenario, the foreseeability of the particular harm that
occurred may be greater than in the previous scenarios, since the

68. See supra Part I.A.
69. See supra Part I.A.2.
70. See supra Part I.A.2. Compare 72 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts - Liability for Security
or Burglar Alarm System Failure § 4 (2013) (“Liability under the strict liability doctrine may
arise by virtue of a defect in the manufacture of, defect in the design of, or a failure to warn with
respect to the use of a security or burglar alarm system.”), with Aegis Ins. Services, Inc. v. 7
World Trade Co., 865 F. Supp. 2d 370, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that plaintiff failed to
show that a building’s alleged design defect caused its damages in a terrorist attack).
71. See ERIC C. SURETTE, 41 AM. JUR. Indemnity § 21 (2d ed. 2014) (“The exceptions to
the rule that indemnity will not be allowed among joint wrongdoers are that a joint wrongdoer
may claim indemnity where he or she has not been guilty of any fault, except technically or
constructively, or where both parties are at fault, but the fault of the party from whom indemnity
is claimed was the efficient cause of the injury.”).
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company was aware of a specific type of threat.72 However, as a
factual matter, the company may be more likely to have acted
reasonably, since it sought to purchase controls to address that
specific threat. As in the previous scenarios, the scope of the
company’s duties and the reasonableness of its precautions are likely
to be issues of fact.
2. Claims Against Other Entities
The cyber security vendor may be liable to the company for
negligence or even strict product liability in this scenario. A finder of
fact is more likely to find that a product was defective when the injury
to the plaintiff was the one that the plaintiff sought to guard against
when it installed the product.73 The cyber security vendor may also
be liable to Company X for breach of contract or breach of warranty
if the vulnerability of the security controls to hackers breached the
parties’ agreement. Contractual clauses requiring Company X to
indemnify or pay contribution to the cyber security vendor for the
vendor’s liability probably would be enforceable in that situation,
although there might be public policy limitations on the scope of that
indemnification.74
II. APPLICATION OF THE SAFETY ACT TO LIABILITY RESULTING
FROM A TERRORIST ATTACK
Given the above scenarios that could result in third party liability
claims, the question is what risk-mitigation tools exist that could
provide a statutory limit to or eliminate such claims? Based on a
review of existing statutes, regulations, and alternative options such
as insurance coverage, the best opportunity for limiting liability is the
SAFETY Act. “Sellers” of cyber security products or services (a term
that also includes companies that develop their own cyber security
plans and procedures and then uses them only for internal purposes)
are eligible to receive liability protections under the SAFETY Act.
Additionally, entities that purchase or deploy SAFETY Act approved
cyber security products and/or services will also have the benefit of

72. See District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 33 (D.C. 1987); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM §34 (2012) (“When . . . an independent act is also a
factual cause of harm, an actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that
made the actor’s conduct tortious.”).
73. See supra Part I.B.
74. See SURETTE, supra note 71, at § 11 (“Agreements that purport to indemnify another
for the other’s intentional negligence may be void as a matter of public policy.”).
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immediate dismissal of third party liability claims arising out of,
related to, or resulting from a declared act of terrorism (which
encompasses cyber attacks, regardless of whether there is any motive
or intent that could be deemed “political” in nature). The basis for
this conclusion, as well as the scope of the immediate dismissal
offered to customers through the purchase of SAFETY Act approved
products or services, is discussed below.
Note that since no litigation specifically involving the SAFETY
Act has occurred yet, there is no established legal precedent
interpreting the statute itself. However, the fundamental principles of
the SAFETY Act are based on the existing common law “government
contractor defense,” a well-established affirmative defense to thirdparty litigation. Accordingly, this article is based on interpretations of
the SAFETY Act, the Final Rule implementing the SAFETY Act, and
the underlying theory of the government contractor defense.
A. Background of the SAFETY Act
The SAFETY Act75 provides extensive liability protections to
entities that are awarded either a “Designation” or a “Certification” as
a Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology (“QATT”).76 Under a
“Designation” award, successful SAFETY Act applications are
entitled to a variety of liability protections, including:
All terrorism-related liability claims must be litigated in federal
court;
Punitive damages and pre-judgment interest awards are barred;
Compensatory damages are capped at an amount agreed to by both
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the applicant.
That damage cap will be equal to a set amount of insurance the
applicant must carry, and once that insurance cap is reached no
further damages may be awarded in a given year;
A bar on joint and several liability; and
Damages awarded to plaintiffs will be offset by any collateral
recoveries they receive (e.g., victims compensation funds, life
77
insurance, etc.)

Should the applicant be awarded a “Certification” under the
SAFETY Act for their QATT, all of the liability protections awarded

75.
76.
77.

6 U.S.C. § 441-44 (2013).
6 U.S.C. § 442(a) (2002); 6 C.F.R. § 25.7 (2006).
6 U.S.C. § 442(a); 6 C.F.R. § 25.7.
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under a “Designation” are available.78 In addition, the Seller of a
QATT will be entitled to an immediate presumption of dismissal of
all third-party liability claims arising out of, or related to, the act of
terrorism.79 The only way this presumption of immunity can be
overcome is to demonstrate that the application contained information
that was submitted through fraud or willful misconduct.80 Absent
such a showing, the cyber attack-related claims against the defendant
will be immediately dismissed.
In order for the SAFETY Act protections to be triggered, the
Secretary of Homeland Security must declare that an “act of
terrorism” has occurred.81 The definition of an “act of terrorism” is
extremely broad, and includes any act that:
(i) is unlawful;
(ii) causes harm to a person, property, or entity, in the United
States, or in the case of a domestic United States air carrier or a
United States-flag vessel (or a vessel based principally in the
United States on which United States income tax is paid and whose
insurance coverage is subject to regulation in the United States), in
or outside the United States; and
(iii) uses or attempts to use instrumentalities, weapons or other
methods designed or intended to cause mass destruction, injury or
82
other loss to citizens or institutions of the United States.

The Secretary has broad discretion to declare that an event is an
“act of terrorism,”83 and once that has been declared, the SAFETY
Act statutory protections will be available to the Seller of the QATT
and others. A cursory review of this definition reveals that there is no
need to divine a motivation for the attack, and that the language used
can (and is) interpreted to include cyber attacks. The only “intent”
that must be demonstrated is the intent to cause destruction, injury, or
other loss.84 Accordingly, cyber attacks trigger the protections of the
SAFETY Act for cyber security products and tools as well.
Moreover, cyber attacks conducted by any entity can be declared an
“act of terrorism” under the SAFETY Act regardless of the

78. 6 C.F.R. § 25.8.
79. Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective
Technologies (SAFETY) Act of 2002, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,147, 33,150 (June 8, 2006).
80. Id. at 33,153-54.
81. 6 U.S.C. § 444(1)-(2) (2013).
82. 6 U.S.C. § 444(2)(b) (2002).
83. Id. § 444(2).
84. Id. § 444(2)(b)(iii).

FINCH & SPIEGEL

370

4/27/2014 7:38 PM

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 30

motivation or purpose of the group. With that background, we can
now explore the protections of the SAFETY Act as extended to
purchasers of QATTs.
B. SAFETY Act Protections Available to Customers and Other
Entities
One of the most significant additional benefits of the SAFETY
Act is that the liability protections awarded to the Seller of the QATT
flow down to customers, suppliers, subcontractors, vendors, and
others who were involved in the development or deployment of the
QATT.85 In other words, when a company buys or otherwise uses a
QATT that has been either SAFETY Act “Designated” or “Certified,”
that customer is entitled to immediate dismissal of claims associated
with the use of the approved technology or service and arising out of,
related to, or resulting from a declared act of terrorism.
The bases for these expanded protections are clearly set forth
both in the SAFETY Act statute and in the Final Rule implementing
the SAFETY Act. Both are detailed below.
With respect to the protections offered to entities other than the
Seller of the QATT, the SAFETY Act statute states as follows:
IN GENERAL.—There shall exist a Federal cause of action for
claims arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of
terrorism when qualified anti-terrorism technologies have been
deployed in defense against or response or recovery from such act
and such claims result or may result in loss to the Seller. The
substantive law for decision in any such action shall be derived
from the law, including choice of law principles, of the State in
which such acts of terrorism occurred, unless such law is
inconsistent with or preempted by Federal law. Such Federal
cause of action shall be brought only for claims for injuries that
are proximately caused by sellers that provide qualified antiterrorism technology to Federal and non-Federal government
86
customers.

The SAFETY Act statute also reads:
JURISDICTION.—Such appropriate district court of the United
States shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions
for any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death arising

85. Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective
Technologies (SAFETY) Act of 2002, 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,150 (“Further, it is clear that the Seller
is the only appropriate defendant in this exclusive Federal cause of action.”).
86. See 6 U.S.C. § 442(a)(1) (2002) (emphasis added).
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out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism when
qualified anti-terrorism technologies have been deployed in
defense against or response or recovery from such act and such
87
claims result or may result in loss to the Seller.

The key language in 6 USC Section 442(a)(1) is that the claims
arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism “shall
be brought only for claims for injuries that are proximately caused by
sellers that provide qualified anti-terrorism technology to Federal and
non-Federal government customers.”88 Further, in Section 442(a)(2),
the SAFETY Act states that U.S. district courts shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction for claims that “result or may result in loss
to the seller.”89
The language in 6 U.S.C. Section 442(a)(1) and (a)(2) reads such
that terrorism-related claims that have or could have resulted in a loss
to the Seller may only be brought in U.S. district courts against the
Seller.90 Nothing in the statute would give rise to claims against other
parties who use or otherwise participate in the delivery and use of the
QATT.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agrees with this
interpretation, and went to great lengths to elaborate upon this point in
the preamble to the Final Rule implementing the SAFETY Act
statute:
Further, it is clear that the Seller is the only appropriate defendant
in this exclusive Federal cause of action. First and foremost, the
Act unequivocally states that a “cause of action shall be brought
only for claims for injuries that are proximately caused by sellers
that provide qualified anti-terrorism technology.” Second, if the
Seller of the Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology at issue were
not the only defendant, would-be plaintiffs could, in an effort to
circumvent the statute, bring claims (arising out of or relating to
the performance or non-performance of the Seller’s Qualified AntiTerrorism Technology) against arguably less culpable persons or
entities, including but not limited to contractors, subcontractors,
suppliers, vendors, and customers of the Seller of the technology.
Because the claims in the cause of action would be predicated on
the performance or non-performance of the Seller’s Qualified AntiTerrorism Technology, those persons or entities, in turn, would file

87. See 6 U.S.C. § 442(a)(2) (2002).
88. Please note that “non-Federal government customers” refers to commercial entities.
89. 6 U.S.C. § 442(a)(2).
90. See also Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective
Technologies (SAFETY) Act of 2002, 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,150.
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a third-party action against the Seller. In such situations, the
claims against non-Sellers thus ‘‘may result in loss to the Seller’’
under 863(a)(2). The Department believes Congress did not intend
through the Act to increase rather than decrease the amount of
litigation arising out of or related to the deployment of Qualified
Anti-Terrorism Technology. Rather, Congress balanced the need
to provide recovery to plaintiffs against the need to ensure
adequate deployment of anti- terrorism technologies by creating a
cause of action that provides a certain level of recovery against
Sellers, while at the same time protecting others in the supply
91
chain.

Within the Final Rule itself, the Department also stated:
There shall exist only one cause of action for loss of property,
personal injury, or death for performance or non- performance of
the Seller’s Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology in relation to an
Act of Terrorism. Such cause of action may be brought only
against the Seller of the Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology and
may not be brought against the buyers, the buyers’ contractors, or
downstream users of the Technology, the Seller’s suppliers or
92
contractors, or any other person or entity.

Thus, both the SAFETY Act statute and the Final Rule
implementing the law make it clear that when there is litigation
involving a SAFETY Act QATT (whether Designated or Certified)
alleging that the QATT was the cause, directly or indirectly, of any
alleged losses, the only proper defendant in such litigation is the
Seller of the QATT. Customers and others are not proper defendants
and are entitled to immediate dismissal, because allowing litigation to
proceed against customers would be contrary to both the SAFETY
Act statute and Congressional intent.
C. Application of SAFETY Act Protections to Cyber Security
Vendors and Their Customers
Considering the above, companies that sell or deploy cyber
security QATTs, as well as their customers, are entitled to extensive
benefits. Sellers of cyber security QATTs are entitled to the broad
protections offered under both a “Designation” and a “Certification.”
Additionally, as discussed in greater detail below, companies that
purchase cyber security QATTs are entitled to unmatched liability
protections.

91.
92.

Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
6 C.F.R. § 25.7 (2006) (emphasis added).
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As explicitly set forth in the SAFETY Act statute and the
SAFETY Act Final Rule, the only proper defendant in litigation
following an act of terrorism allegedly involving a SAFETY Act
Designated and/or Certified QATT is the Seller itself.93 In this case,
the “Seller” would be the cyber security vendor or company that
deploys its own internally developed cyber security policies,
procedures, or technologies with the QATT being said Certified or
Designated cyber security policies, procedures, or even technologies.
The basis for this analysis rests upon the fact that sellers of cyber
security QATTs will have received the QATT Designation or
Certification, thus conferring upon them specific statutory liability
protections. Further, based on the extensive analysis conducted above
regarding the applicability of the SAFETY Act statute and Final Rule,
buyers of cyber security QATTs will be considered “customers” for
SAFETY Act purposes, and therefore entitled to immediate dismissal
of claims related to approved cyber security technology or service.
Thus, for any of the previously discussed scenarios where liability to
third parties could occur, the SAFETY Act can serve as an excellent
tool to mitigate or eliminate said liability.
This interpretation is based upon the SAFETY Act statute and
Final Rule, both of which make it clear that the purpose of the
SAFETY Act is to dramatically limit litigation following a terrorist or
cyber attack and narrow the universe of possible defendants as much
as possible.94 In the case of cyber security QATTs, allowing litigation
to proceed against customers of those QATTs would be in violation
of the plain language of the SAFETY Act. Therefore, claims against
the cyber security QATT customers would be an attempt to
circumvent litigation against the Seller of the technology, and should
not be allowed under the SAFETY Act statute.
Accordingly, customers of cyber security QATTs are entitled to
receive significant liability protections as a result of a SAFETY Act
Designation and/or Certification to the Seller, and such protections
will dramatically limit customers’ exposure to potential litigation
following a cyber attack. Additionally, the Seller of the cyber
security QATT would be entitled to all appropriate protections
offered by the SAFETY Act, whether those offered by Designation or
the presumption of dismissal offered by Certification. It is important
to note that cyber security QATT customers and Sellers could still

93.
94.

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Parts II.A-B.
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face cyber security related litigation should the Homeland Security
Secretary not declare the cyber attack to be an “act of terrorism” or if
the claims do not relate to the QATT as defined by the Department of
Homeland Security.95
CONCLUSION
Entities that are potentially at risk for third-party liability claims
following a cyber attack can be materially protected through the
SAFETY Act. Users of SAFETY Act-approved cyber security
products or services will also receive direct and tangible benefits.
The SAFETY Act provides strong liability protections that will flow
down to such customers per the language of the SAFETY Act statute
and Final Rule. Cyber attacks and cyber security products and
services are covered by the language of the SAFETY Act, and thus,
such products and services are also eligible to provide dramatically
limited litigation and for such litigation to be limited to “Sellers,” not
“customers.”
Certainly not every cyber attack will result in liability for cyber
security vendors or their customers, particularly with respect to third
party liability. Should such liability occur, however, it can be
mitigated or eliminated using the SAFETY Act.

95. With the definition of “act of terrorism” set forth under the SAFETY Act,
functionally any unlawful attack intended to cause harm to the U.S., its populace, or its
economic interests could be considered a “terrorist” attack. The Secretary has extraordinarily
broad discretion with respect to declaring an event an “act of terrorism”, and so that should be
considered the appropriate boundaries for purposes of the SAFETY Act. No events have been
declared acts of terrorism yet, so we still operate in the realm of the hypothetical. It will depend
on what party is in office—odds are a Republican administration will consider a broader range
of events as “acts of terrorism”, and the opposite will hold true for a Democratic administration.
However, that is a guess given the absence of any actual declarations by the Secretary of
Homeland Security.

